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economic or social summits, including tax and incentives, 
financial infrastructure, connectivity and the development 
of economic policies.
A key issue discussed in this session was energy. One of 
the few generally discussed specific suggestions regarding 
the shaping of a particular SDG was that of the development 
of “sustainable energy access for all”, a discussion that was 
also linked to energy efficiency and renewable energy. 
Regarding this item, the Group also noted the integrated 
nature of the unenumerated SDGs, particularly the potential 
relationship between a sustainable-access-to-energy SDG 
and the still-seminal SDGs on health, water, food and 
women’s empowerment.
Although the meeting did not produce any finally drafted 
goals, the Co-Chairs noted a “high level of convergence 
among delegations” particularly on “the prerequisite of 
growth for poverty eradication; industrialization and 
infrastructure development as key drivers of growth; 
open, fair, rules-based trade; access to safe, affordable and 
reliable energy; the important role of renewable energy in 
the energy system; and the crucial roles of energy efficiency 
and conservation as components of sustainability”. 
Presumably, awareness of this convergence will guide 
the drafting process when the goal or goals relating to 
sustainable economic growth and energy are drafted. 
According to the Group’s process and schedule, this 5th 
session was intended as the primary (or perhaps the only) 
session in which those goals are discussed.4
The OWG will meet one more time this year, from 
9–13 December,5 at which time the issues under discussion 
will be the means of implementation of the SDGs (i.e., 
science and technology, knowledge sharing and capacity 
building); the global partnership for development; the needs 
of countries in special situations; human rights; the right to 
development; and global governance. (TRY)
Notes
1 A detailed summary of the meeting will be available online at http://www.
iisd.ca/sdgs/owg5/. That summary is unavailable, however, as of the writing of this 
report, which is therefore based on the IISD’s less detailed web-page summaries 
of each meeting (online at http://www.iisd.ca/sdgs/owg5/25nov.html, http://www.
iisd.ca/sdgs/owg5/26nov.html and http://www.iisd.ca/sdgs/owg5/27nov.html), 
supplemented by review of documents and recordings personally received and 
personal communication with persons in attendance at the session.
2 Reported to be the focus of a presentation by Jagdish Bhagwati, Columbia 
University, on 25 November 2013.
3 Reported comment in the presentation of Mukhisa Kituyi, UN Conference on 
Trade and Development, on 25 November 2013.
4 The first three meetings of the OWG-SDG were reported in EPL 43(2) at 72 and 
EPL 43(3) at 122–27. The fourth meeting (held on 17–19 June 2013) was reported 
in the UN website at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1636.
5 To be reported in EPL 44(2), which, owing to the publication of a “special 
issue” as the first issue of 2014, will be the first standard issue of 2014.
UNFCCC CoP-19
Just Another Climate Conference
by Annalisa Savaresi*
Representatives of Parties to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) gathered 
in Warsaw with a range of observers for the 19th 
Conference of Parties (CoP-19) from 11–23 November 
2013. Following the havoc in South-east Asia caused by 
super-typhoon Haiyan and in light of the content of the 
early-released preliminary findings of the Fifth Report 
of the IPCC,1 according to which “it is extremely likely 
that human influence has been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-20th century”, spirits 
were low, even by the standards of a climate conference. 
Controversy surrounding the credibility of the Polish 
presidency was apparent even before the meeting started, 
with numerous NGOs criticising the conference’s hosts 
for their coal- and shale-gas-friendly energy policies.2 
While not much was expected from CoP-19, the agenda 
for the meeting was crowded with old and new contentious 
questions, including institutional arrangements to 
address loss and damage associated with climate change 
impacts; and a proposal to address decision making in the 
UNFCCC process put forward by the Russian Federation. 
In particular, delegates had to grapple with arrears in the 
work of one of its subsidiary bodies, the Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation (SBI), which had been unable to hold 
its regular meeting in June, due to a dispute over matters 
of procedure3 and to attempt to resolve that dispute.
After a fortnight of particularly intense negotiations 
that already during the first week extended sessions well 
into the night, the meeting concluded one day later than 
initially scheduled. At its conclusion, CoP-19 had adopted 
40 decisions, dealing with a wide range of issues, but 
leaving many others unresolved. This report provides an 
overview of the outcome of the meeting, highlighting its 
main achievements and shortcomings.
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action: 
Much Effort and Little Progress 
At CoP-19, the third part of the second session of the 
negotiation platform known as the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action (ADP) was held. Many waited with 
trepidation to see whether this session would deliver some 
progress towards developing “a protocol, another legal 
instrument or a legal outcome” applicable to “all Parties”, 
to be adopted by 2015 and implemented from 2020.4 It 
had been hoped that the ADP would start working on 
this in earnest in 2013, after the closure of its embattled 
predecessor, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
* Ph.D., Research Fellow, University of Edinburgh and regular contributor to 
EPL.
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Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA). 
Earlier meetings in 2013, however, had proven that the 
ADP was very much weighted down by the divisions that 
characterised the AWG-LCA.5 Negotiations in Warsaw 
did not do much better, featuring entrenched divisions, 
and risking virtual paralysis. 
At CoP-19, the ADP continued to operate under 
two separate workstreams: one addressing the elements 
and modalities of the 2015 agreement; and the other on 
enhancing the level of ambition for the pre-2020 period. 
Unfortunately only limited progress was made on both 
fronts. The Co-chairs struggled to make delegates adhere 
to a more structured framework for discussion, as long-
standing divisions over the interpretation to be given to 
Parties’ differentiated responsibilities were reiterated, in 
a litany of familiar statements which provided a further 
demonstration of how difficult it is to reach consensus 
in a highly polarised process, where Parties have to 
struggle to find any common ground. Only after several 
long nights and a whole additional day spent in informal 
consultations, did delegates manage to reach a hard-won 
compromise over a lean decision which, though certainly 
more elaborate than the two paragraphs agreed at CoP-18, 
falls short of setting a clear path to the adoption of a new 
climate agreement in 2015, and to increasing the level of 
ambition pre-2020.
In three pages, the ADP is requested to “accelerate 
its development” of the 2015 Agreement, and to “further 
elaborate, beginning at its first session in 2014, elements for 
a draft negotiating text including, inter alia, on mitigation, 
adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, 
capacity-building and transparency of action and support”.6 
While a more detailed list of such elements was discussed 
in Warsaw, the list was eventually expunged from the 
text in the last hours of feverish informal consultations. 
Parties are instead invited to “initiate or intensify domestic 
preparations for their intended nationally determined 
contributions”, and to communicate them ahead of CoP-
20 – or by the first quarter of 2015 for those Parties “ready 
to do so”.
As far as pre-2020 ambition is concerned, the ADP’s 
decision was equally generic, reiterating invitations to 
Parties to communicate quantified economy-wide emission 
reduction targets, and to increase technology, finance and 
capacity-building support.7 The ADP has scheduled extra 
sessions for 2014, the first of which will take place in Bonn 
in March 2014, and a high-level ministerial dialogue to be 
held in conjunction with the subsidiary bodies’ meeting 
in Bonn in June. These additional efforts are aimed at 
smoothing the path towards the climate summit to be 
organised by the United Nations Secretary-General in 
September 2014 to mobilise action and ambition in relation 
to climate change. However, after so much effort and such 
limited progress at CoP-19, the ADP negotiations in 2014 
appear to face bleak prospects. 
The Warsaw International Mechanism on 
Loss and Damage
For developing countries, one of the most important 
issues for negotiation in Warsaw related to the need for 
institutional arrangements to address loss and damage 
associated with climate change impacts. The inclusion of 
this item in the agenda for CoP-19 had prompted hopes that 
it would open the way to the provision of “new, predictable, 
and reliable financial support for the assessment of, and 
responses to, loss and damage”.8 Negotiations on this issue 
proved to be extremely contentious. Initially, this item was 
placed on the agenda of the SBI; however, it eventually 
had to be taken up in ministerial consultations, which did 
not conclude until the very closing hours 
of the meeting. 
The decision emerging from this 
febrile consultative process established 
the “Warsaw international mechanism 
on loss and damage”, as a tool to enhance 
knowledge and understanding, strengthen 
dialogue, coordination, coherence and 
synergies, and enhance action and 
“support, including finance, technology 
and capacity building”. 9 To the 
disappointment of developing countries, 
the mechanism was established under 
the Cancun Adaptation Framework, 
although a preambular reference added 
at the last minute specifically mentions 
that “loss and damage associated with 
the adverse effects of climate change includes, and in some 
cases involves more than, that which can be reduced by 
adaptation”.10 Far from being a mere matter of semantics, 
the configuration of loss and damage as an issue separate 
from mitigation and adaptation is potentially heavily 
laden with important legal consequences, including the 
possibility of opening the way to compensation for damage 
caused by climate change.11 At present this possibility 
seems rather remote. Nevertheless, Parties agreed to 
review the Warsaw international mechanism on loss and 
damage by CoP-22, including “its structure, mandate and 
effectiveness”.12 
UNFCCC Decision Making 
Another potentially explosive issue at CoP-19 
concerned decision making in the UNFCCC process. 
This agenda item was embodied in a proposal submitted 
COP-18 President Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah (Qatar) handing over the ceremonial gavel to CoP-19 
President Marcin Korolec (Poland) Courtesy: IISD/Earth Negotiations Bulletin
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by the Russian Federation in October 2013,13 which, inter 
alia, drew attention to the need to “re-build confidence 
in the UNFCCC”, after “serious procedural and legal 
flaws”, specifically noting that the “frequency of dubious 
proceedings [is] acquiring alarming magnitude and the 
conduct of business [is] deviating more and more from the 
Draft Rules of Procedure, as well as working practices of 
the United Nations system, core provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations and basic principles of international 
law, such as the principle of sovereign equality”.14 
Incidents in which CoP Presidents have virtually 
ignored some Parties’ opposition to a particular item, in 
their zeal to facilitate the formation of consensus have not 
been uncommon in the history of the UNFCCC. The most 
recent such episode occurred at CoP-18 in Doha, when the 
Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine tried to block the 
adoption of the outcome decision of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), and subsequently protested 
against what they alleged was the Presidency’s violation of 
the Rules of Procedure in the course of its adoption.15 After 
the same countries unsuccessfully attempted to insert the 
issue into the agenda of the scheduled June 2013 meeting 
of the SBI, creating a level of contention so intense that it 
completely blocked the work of that body, delegates agreed 
to formally include this item on the agenda for CoP-19.16 
Discussions were animated, showing that this 
matter is close to the heart of many Parties, not only 
the Russian Federation. Some delegates emphasised the 
need to understand the meaning of consensus, to clarify 
the role of the presiding officer and of the UNFCCC 
Secretariat, and, more generally, to establish a clear legal 
environment, that does not tolerate this type of deviation. 
Numerous Parties agreed that there was a need to ensure 
respect for the sovereignty of all Parties, as well as to 
safeguard the inclusiveness, legitimacy and transparency 
of CoP deliberations and decisions, recalling CoP-15 in 
Copenhagen as a negative example. Others called for 
revisiting recent practices that favoured the adoption of 
“take it or leave it” packages of decisions.17
Like other MEAs, the UNFCCC has not been able 
to formally adopt its rules of procedure, because of lack 
of consensus on certain rules of voting – an issue that is 
unlikely to be solved by the current troubled process. While 
at CoP-19, however, some convergence emerged on the 
timeliness of discussions to increase the effectiveness of 
negotiations; and several delegates expressed concern over 
the sacrifice of inclusiveness in the quest for effectiveness. 
While some delegations favoured the adoption of a 
decision on this issue at CoP-19, Parties could not reach 
an agreement and open-ended informal consultations on 
this thorny matter will continue in 2014.
The Warsaw REDD+ Framework 
After unexpected progress at the 38th meeting of 
the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA-38) in June,18 many opined 
that CoP-19 would be a “REDD+ CoP”.19 The 2007 Bali 
Action Plan included a call for “policy approaches and 
positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries” (more commonly known 
by the acronym REDD+).20 Throughout the life of the 
AWG-LCA, UNFCCC Parties have struggled to agree on 
the means of putting REDD+ into practice, in the end only 
managing to adopt a handful of decisions on the matter, 
without providing any clear and definitive internationally 
coordinated rules on how to carry out REDD+ activities. 
With the closure of AWG-LCA, REDD+ concerns 
remained, including the choice of the most appropriate 
forum to continue negotiations on this component 
of the climate regime, an element that was relatively 
uncontentious but nevertheless hardly developed.21
CoP-19 managed to “leap forward” on REDD+, 
reflected in the adoption of seven decisions on REDD+ 
finance, institutional arrangements and methodological 
issues. These decisions have been collectively referred to 
as the “Warsaw REDD+ Framework”. While some of the 
methodological issues addressed had been recommended 
by SBSTA-38 and needed only to be formally adopted, 
CoP-19 had to deal with the particularly contentious matters 
of finance and institutional arrangements, admittedly, the 
most important and divisive pieces of the puzzle, in order 
to complete the REDD+ framework.
The Warsaw REDD+ Framework included decisions on 
both these issues, although they are hardly groundbreaking 
and may rather be regarded as an acknowledgement of the 
status quo. Although negotiations on REDD+ under the 
UNFCCC continued at a slow pace, numerous developing 
countries have made voluntary pledges to reduce their 
emissions in the forest sector, undertaking reforms with 
the assistance of international initiatives to facilitate so-
called “REDD+ readiness”, most prominently the United 
Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD) 
and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). As a 
result, the REDD+ readiness process has become a complex 
of international standards and bilateral endeavours, carried 
out beyond the institutional scope of the UNFCCC.22 The 
debate on REDD+ institutional arrangements and finance at 
CoP-19 was largely focused on how to bring these diverse 
processes under the guidance of the UNFCCC. 
On institutional arrangements, while suggestions 
had been made to establish a specialised body under 
the UNFCCC in charge of coordinating support for the 
implementation of REDD+ activities, Parties merely agreed 
to “invite” interested Parties to designate national entities 
or focal points; and to “encourage” them to collectively 
meet with relevant entities financing REDD+ activities on 
a voluntary basis, in conjunction with the sessional period 
meetings of the subsidiary bodies.23
On finance, Parties reiterated, in line with their 
previous decisions, that results-based finance provided to 
developing-country Parties for the full implementation of 
REDD+ activities may come from a variety of sources, 
public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including 
alternative sources. They further agreed that developing 
countries seeking results-based payments should provide 
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the most recent summary of information on how all 
safeguards have been addressed and respected. Lastly, an 
information hub was established as a means of publishing 
information on the results of REDD+ activities and 
corresponding results-based payments.24
Whether these developments have laid sufficiently 
firm grounds to allow the further development of REDD+ 
activities within the framework of the UNFCCC remains 
to be seen. Given sluggish progress on other items on 
the negotiation agenda for CoP-19, however, it is hardly 
surprising that CoP-19 has hailed this modest outcome 
embedded in the Warsaw REDD+ Framework as a 
considerable success. 
Unfinished Business
Numerous items on the agenda for CoP-19 were 
left unfinished. These included some outstanding 
technical questions concerning the second commitment 
of the Kyoto Protocol; the contentious issue of so-called 
“response measures”; the roles of market and non-market 
mechanisms; and review of the modalities and procedures 
for the Clean Development Mechanism. Some of these 
issues have been on the negotiation agenda for some time 
and reaching consensus has long been a challenge. Others, 
like agriculture, have been included on the negotiation 
agenda only recently, but failed to garner consensus for 
internationally coordinated action.25 Items concerning 
relations with other international regimes, such as the 
UNFCCC’s role in the Montreal Protocol debate over 
phasing out hydrofluorocarbons, and the role of intellectual 
property rights in technology transfer, are so contentious 
that they appear to have become effective taboos.
Another important area where lack of progress was 
palpable was the never-ending debate on long-term finance. 
Since CoP-15, Parties have been discussing developed 
countries’ fulfilment of their pledge to mobilise jointly 
US $ 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs 
of developing countries.26 While some Parties in Warsaw 
pledged funding for the Adaptation Fund established under 
the Kyoto Protocol, for the Least Developed Countries 
Fund27 and for REDD+ finance, little substantial progress 
was made on the capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF), which has been expected to become the main 
instrument for the transfer of finance under the Convention. 
The CoP-19 decision merely agreed to request developed-
country Parties to prepare biennial submissions on their 
updated strategies and approaches for scaling-up climate 
finance from 2014 to 2020,28 calling also for “ambitious 
and timely” contributions to enable the operationalisation 
of the GCF.29
More generally, CoP-19 in Warsaw may be regarded 
as the last in a series of meetings in which Parties to the 
UNFCCC failed to take significant action, increasing the 
level of ambition towards achievement of the objective of 
stabilising greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
“at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system”.30 In spite of growing 
scientific clarity over the impacts of anthropogenic climate 
change, and of policies that may be deployed to counter 
them, the international climate regime continues to lack 
the political will necessary to effect urgently needed 
internationally coordinated action to tackle climate change. 
If anything, the UNFCCC process is becoming increasingly 
sclerotic, with some Parties backtracking on Kyoto Protocol 
commitments and others refusing to face up to the changed 
realities of global emission patterns, which have seen some 
developing countries overtaking developed ones in their 
global emissions levels. The road to the adoption of a 
climate agreement in Paris in 2015 seems steep.
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